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Molina v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 21, 87 P.3d 533 (Nev. 2004)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 This case involves an appeal of a conviction entered on guilty pleas negotiated 
with the state.  The defendant, Molina, alleged that he plead guilty because his lawyer’s 
inadequate assistance did not allow him to make an informed decision to plead guilty.  He 
also contended that his attorney violated the attorney-client privilege by divulging 
communications between him and his attorney. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed.  The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that Molina had failed to show 
ineffective assistance from counsel because he did not demonstrate that but for his 
counsel’s mistakes, he would not have pled guilty.  Molina also failed to show a violation 
of the attorney-client privilege because the attorney divulged privileged communications 
to defend himself against the accusation of inadequate assistance. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Molina was charged with three counts of sexual assault with a minor fourteen 
years of age, two counts of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age, and one 
count of annoying a minor.  Molina was initially represented by the public defender.  
Subsequently, Molina fired the public defender and hired private counsel.  Molina’s 
private counsel was under the impression that he was hired to negotiate a better plea 
agreement than what the public defender had previously done.  After reviewing the 
evidence against Molina and having discussions with the public defender that initially 
handled the case, Molina’s counsel advised him that the present plea agreement was 
probably the best he could do.  Molina then decided to accept the offer and plead guilty to 
one count of sexual assault and one count of lewdness with a minor.  The trial court 
canvassed Molina at which time he admitted to the allegations set forth in the plea.  The 
trial court concluded that he freely and voluntarily pled guilty the allegations.   
 Molina then moved to withdraw his guilty plea before he was sentenced.  Molina 
claimed that he did not enter into the plea agreement knowingly and willingly because of 
ineffective assistance by his counsel.  He argued that his counsel had met with him only 
once, advised him that he had to accept the agreement, and did not explore all possible 
options concerning his case with him.  Molina’s counsel argued that he met with him 
twice, had six telephonic conversations with him, discussed the evidence against him, and 
discussed what the state would need to prove in the case.  Counsel also informed Molina 
that because he lacked a defense to the allegations, the State’s plea offer was the best he 
could do.  The trial court denied Molina’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.   
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Discussion 
 
 The court began its discussion by citing the two-part test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel set fourth in Strickland v. Washington.2  Strickland states that a defendant 
must show that counsel’s performance fell below the objective standard of 
reasonableness and that the defense was prejudiced by such action.3  The court also noted 
at the outset that there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the 
reasonable objective standard.4  The court will examine the totality of the circumstances 
to determine whether a defendant entered his plea freely and voluntarily.5 
 The court found that Molina failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel because he could not show that his counsel’s performance was deficient under 
Strickland.  Molina’s counsel testified that he discussed the plea agreement and the 
evidence with him.  Molina and his counsel clearly understood the evidence and the 
ramifications of the decision to plead guilty.  While Molina complained that his attorney 
did not make trial preparations, the court held that counsel is not required to exhaust all 
available public or private resources to render effective assistance.  Molina was aware of 
the evidence against him and he also understood what his plea entailed.  Based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Molina’s motion to withdraw his plea. 
 Molina also argued that the trial court erred by allowing his counsel to divulge 
privileged communications.  Molina’s counsel testified that Molina told him, in front of 
Mrs. Molina, that he had committed the acts he was charged with.  Molina argued that he 
did not waive the privilege by filing his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  The court 
recognized that attorney-client communications are confidential unless waived, but states 
that a waiver of the privilege occurs when the attorney must respond to claims concerning 
representation of the client.6  Further, statute provides that a post-conviction petition that 
claims ineffective assistance of counsel effectively waives the attorney-client privilege.7  
While Molina’s petition was presentence, the court finds that the same rule should apply.  
The discussions between the client and attorney are always relevant in determining 
whether the attorney’s assistance met the objective reasonable standard.  The court 
                                                 
2 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
3 Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Nev. 1996) (applying the Strickland test in 
Nevada). 
4 Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 115, 825 P.2d 593, 595 (Nev. 1992). 
5 Crawford v. State, 117 Nev. 718, 722, 30 P.3d 1123, 1125-26 (Nev. 2001). 
6 See NEV. REV. STAT. 49.055 (2004).   This statutes states that “a communication is ‘confidential’ if it is 
not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in the furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of 
the communication.”; See also NEV. SUP. CT. R. 156(3)(b).  This rule states that  
“a lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary: to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil 
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the 
client.” 
7 See NEV. REV. STAT. 34.735 (2004). 
further stated that holding the opposite would allow a defendant to use insufficient 
communication as a “sword” to claim ineffective assistance of counsel.8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test in 
Strickland.  Molina failed to show that his attorney’s performance was not that of a 
reasonable attorney in the same position.  An attorney is not required to use every 
possible resource to meet this standard.   
 Additionally, the attorney-client privilege is waived when a defendant claims 
ineffective assistance by counsel.  The communications between the client and attorney 
are crucial to the claim.  Therefore, Molina waived the privilege when he made the claim 
in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Molina v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 21, 18, 87 P.3d 533, 539 (Nev. 2004). 
